Slide 1
Induction extends observed patterns to unseen cases
Induction moves from observed cases to claims about unobserved ones. It supports everyday expectations without making them deductively certain.
More to Read
Suppose the morning bus has arrived punctually all week. Expecting punctuality tomorrow goes beyond the recorded journeys. The extra step is useful, but tomorrow is not one of the cases already inspected.
Slide 2
Matching observations cannot guarantee the next one
A long run of matching observations can strengthen an expectation. It cannot logically rule out a different next observation.
More to Read
Increasing a sample is different from changing its scope. A hundred weekday journeys may tell little about a new weekend timetable. Representativeness matters alongside the number of observations collected.
Slide 3
Hume asked what justifies expecting the past to continue
David Hume asked what justifies extending past regularities into the future. Saying it worked before appears to use induction to defend induction.
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A proof from definitions would not establish that tomorrow resembles yesterday. An appeal to previous success already assumes that past success is relevant to the next occasion, which is precisely the bridge under examination.
Slide 4
Habit explains an expectation without proving it justified
Hume connected our expectations with habit. Explaining why people form an expectation is not the same task as proving it justified.
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Someone can explain why a familiar sound makes them anticipate a delivery without establishing that the delivery will occur today. Psychological regularity and evidential support answer different questions about the same expectation.
Slide 5
The unresolved problem does not make all predictions equal
Philosophers disagree about how to justify induction and what justification must achieve. The problem does not show that all predictions are equally good.
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In the bus example, a service cancellation is relevant new evidence. Taking it seriously improves the prediction even though no universal solution to inductive justification has been supplied. Fallibility need not erase distinctions in support.
Sources
- The Problem of Induction
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy